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Recently the first physically realistic protocol amplifying the randomness of Santha-Vazirani
sources using a finite number of no-signaling devices and with a constant rate of noise has been pro-
posed, however there still remained the open question whether this can be accomplished under the
minimal conditions necessary for the task. Namely, is it possible to achieve randomness amplification
using only two no-signaling devices and in a situation where the violation of a Bell inequality implies
only an upper bound for some outcome probability for some setting combination? Here, we solve this
problem and present the first device-independent protocol for the task of randomness amplification
of Santha-Vazirani sources using a device consisting of only two non-signaling components. We show
that the protocol can amplify any such source that is not fully deterministic into a totally random
source while tolerating a constant noise rate and prove the security of the protocol against general
no-signaling adversaries. The minimum requirement for a device-independent Bell inequality based
protocol for obtaining randomness against no-signaling attacks is that every no-signaling box that
obtains the observed Bell violation has the conditional probability P (x|u) of at least a single input-
output pair (u, x) bounded from above. We show how one can construct protocols for randomness
amplification in this minimalistic scenario.
INTRODUCTION
Random number generators are ubiquitous, finding
applications in varied domains such as statistical sam-
pling, computer simulations and gambling scenarios.
While certain physical phenomena such as radioactive
decay or thermal noise have high natural entropy, there
are also many computational algorithms that can pro-
duce sequences of apparently random bits. In many
cryptographic tasks however, it may be necessary to
have trustworthy sources of randomness. As such,
developing so-called device-independent protocols for
generating random bits is of paramount importance.
We consider the task of randomness amplification,
that is to convert a source of partially random bits to
one of fully random bits. The paradigmatic model of a
source of randomness is the Santha-Vazirani (SV) source
[1], a model of a biased coin where the individual coin
tosses are not independent but that rather the bits Yi
produced by the source obey
1
2
− ε ≤ P (Yi = 0|Yi−1, . . . , Y1) ≤ 1
2
+ ε (1)
for some 0 ≤ ε < 12 . Here ε is a parameter describing
the reliability of the source of randomness, the task be-
ing to convert a source with ε < 12 into one with ε → 0.
Interestingly, this task is known to be impossible with
classical resources, a single SV source cannot be ampli-
fied [1].
In [5], the non-local correlations in quantum mechan-
ics were shown to provide an advantage in the task of
amplifying an SV source. A device-independent proto-
col for generating truly random bits was demonstrated
starting from a certain critical value of ε(≈ 0.06), where
the device-independence refers to the fact that one need
not trust the internal workings of the device. An im-
provement was made in [7] where using an arbitrar-
ily large number of spatially separated devices, it was
shown that one could amplify randomness starting from
any initial ε < 12 . In [8], we demonstrated a device-
independent protocol which used a constant number of
space-like separated components and amplified sources
of arbitrary initial parameter ε < 12 while at the same
time tolerating a constant amount of noise in its imple-
mentation.
For fundamental as well as practical reasons, it is vi-
tally important to minimize the number of spatially sep-
arated components used in a protocol. As such, devis-
ing a protocol with the minimum possible number of
components (namely, two space-like separated ones for
a protocol based on a Bell test) while at the same time,
allowing for robustness to errors in its implementation
is crucial. Note that since there are examples in quan-
tum information where multi-partite protocols are easy
to formulate while bipartite ones are difficult or even not
known to exist (such as the bipartite NPT bound entan-
glement problem) the question about a two-device pro-
tocol was not just technical.
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2A necessary condition for a device-independent Bell-
based protocol for obtaining randomness against no-
signaling attacks is that for some input u∗ ∈ U, out-
put x∗ ∈ X and a constant c < 1, every no-signaling
box {P (x|u)} that obtains the observed Bell violation has
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ c. i.e.,
∃(x∗,u∗) s.t. ∀{P (x|u)} with B.{P (x|u)} = 0
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ c < 1, (2)
where B.{P (x|u)} = 0 denotes that the box achieves
algebraic violation of the inequality. Note that while
the Bell inequality violation guarantees Eq.(2) for some
x∗,u∗ for each NS box, here the requirement is for a
strictly bounded common entry P (x = x∗|u = u∗) for
all boxes leading to the observed Bell violation. It is
straightforward to see that if Eq. (2) is not met, then no
device-independent protocol for obtaining randomness
can be built out of the observed non-local correlations.
If in addition to the necessary condition in Eq. (2), we
also had for the same input-output pair (u∗, x∗) that
c˜ ≤ P (x = x∗|u = u∗) (3)
for some constant c˜ > 0, then clearly one can con-
struct a device-independent protocol to extract random-
ness in this scenario. Here, we present a fully device-
independent protocol that allows to amplify the ran-
domness of any ε-SV source under the minimal neces-
sary condition in Eq. (2). A novel element of the proto-
col is an additional test (to the usual test for violation of
a Bell inequality) that the honest parties perform, akin
to partial tomography of the boxes, that ensures that
additionally Eq.(3) is also met for a sufficient number
of runs. The protocol uses a device consisting of only
two no-signaling components and tolerates a constant
error rate, we present a proof of security of the protocol
against general no-signaling adversaries (not limited to
the use of quantum boxes).
Main Result
In this paper we present a two-party protocol to am-
plify the randomness of SV sources, formally we prove
the following:
Theorem 1. For every ε < 12 , there is a protocol using an ε-
SV source and two non-signaling devices with the following
properties:
• Using the devices poly(n, 1/δ) times, the protocol ei-
ther aborts or produces n bits which are δ-close to uni-
form and independent of any side information.
• Local measurements on many copies of a two-party en-
tangled state, with poly(1− 2ε) error rate, give rise to
devices that do not abort the protocol with probability
larger than 1− 2−Ω(n).
PROTOCOL AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SETUP
Protocol I
1. The ε-SV source is used to choose the measurement set-
tings u = (u1≤n,u
2
≤n) for the single device consisting
of two components. The device produces output bits
x = (x1≤n, x
2
≤n).
2. The parties perform an estimation of the violation of the
Bell inequality in the device by computing the empirical
average Ln(x, u) := 1n
∑n
i=1B(xi,ui). The protocol is
aborted unless Ln(x, u) ≤ δ for some fixed constant δ >
0.
3. Conditioned on not aborting in the previ-
ous step, the parties subsequently check if
Sn(x, u) := 1n
∑n
i=1D(xi,ui) ≥ µ1. The protocol
is aborted if this condition is not met for fixed µ1 > 0.
4. Conditoned on not aborting in the previous steps, the
parties apply the independent source extractor from [2]
to the sequence of outputs from the device and a further
n bits from the SV source.
FIG. 1: Protocol for device-independent randomness amplifi-
cation from a single device with two no-signaling components
using a non-explicit extractor.
The protocol for the task of randomness amplification
from Santha-Vazirani sources is given precisely in Fig.
1, its structure is as follows. The two honest parties Al-
ice and Bob use bits from the ε-SV source to choose the
inputs to their no-signaling boxes in multiple runs of a
Bell test and obtain their respective outputs. They check
for the violation of a Bell inequality and abort the pro-
tocol if the test condition is not met. The novel part of
the protocol is a subsequent test that the honest parties
perform that ensures when passed the presence of suf-
ficient number of runs performed with boxes that have
randomness in their outputs. If both tests in the proto-
col are passed, the parties apply a randomness extractor
to the output bits and some further bits taken from the
SV source. The output bits of the extractor constitute
the output of the protocol, which we show to be close
to being fully random and uncorrelated from any no-
signaling adversary.
The setup of the protocol is as follows. The honest
parties and Eve share a no-signaling box {P (x, z|u′, w)}
where u′ = u’≤n and x = x≤n denote the input and
output respectively of the honest parties for the n runs
of the protocol, with w and z the respective inputs and
outputs of the adversary Eve. The devices held by the
honest parties are separated into m = 2 components
with corresponding inputs and outputs u′i and xi re-
spectively, for i = 1, 2, i.e., u′ = (u′1, u′2) and x =
(x1, x2). Note that u′i, xi themselves denote the inputs
and outputs of the n runs of the protocol for party i,
i.e., u′i = u’i≤n and xi = xi≤n where u’
i
≤n is short for
3(u’i1, . . . ,u’
i
n) and similarly xi≤n stands for (x
i
1, . . . , xin).
Here, for the j-th run of the Bell test, we label the mea-
surement settings of Alice u’1j and those of Bob u’
2
j with
the corresponding outcomes x1j and x
2
j respectively. The
honest parties draw bits u from the SV source to input
into the box, i.e., they set u′ = u, they also draw fur-
ther n bits t which will be fed along with the outputs
x into the randomness extractor to obtain the output of
the protocol s := Ext(x, t). The adversary has classical
information e correlated to u, t. The box we consider for
the protocol is therefore given by the family of probabil-
ity distributions {P (x, z, u, t, e|u′, w)}.
For Ln(x, u) = 1n
∑n
i=1B(xi,ui), the first test in the
protocol is passed when Ln(x, u) ≤ δ, we define the set
ACC1 as the set of (x, u) such that this test (for the viola-
tion of the Bell inequality given by B(xi,ui)) is passed:
ACC1 := {(x, u) : Ln(x, u) ≤ δ}. (4)
The δ is the noise parameter in the Bell test which is cho-
sen to be a positive constant depending on the initial ε
of the SV source, going to zero in the limit of ε → 12 .
Similarly, we define the set ACC2 as the set of (x, u)
for which the second test is passed, i.e., those for which
Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1
ACC2 := {(x, u) : Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1} . (5)
We also define the set ACC = ACC1∩ACC2 of (x, u) for
which both tests in the protocol are passed and ACCu as
the cut
ACCu := {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC}. (6)
After u is input as u′ and conditioned on the accep-
tance of the tests ACC, applying the independent source
extractor s = Ext(x, t) one gets the following box
p(s, z, e|w,ACC)
≡
∑
u
∑
Ext(x,t)=s
p(x, z, u, t, e|w,ACC) (7)
The composable security criterion is now defined in
terms of the distance of p(s, z, e|w,ACC) to an ideal
box pid = 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC) with p(z, e|w,ACC) =∑
s p(s, z, e|w,ACC), given as
dc =
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣p(s, z, e|w,ACC)− 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC)
∣∣∣∣ .
(8)
The assumptions under which we prove the security of
the protocol (i.e., that the distance dc vanishes) are stated
formally in the Supplemental Material. Briefly, the main
assumptions are that the different components of the
device do not signal to each other and to the adver-
sary Eve. Additionally, there is also a time-ordered no-
signaling structure assumed on different runs of a single
component, the outputs in any run may depend on the
previous inputs within the component but not on future
inputs. Moreover, we also assume that the structure of
the box is fixed independently of the SV source, in other
words that the box is an unknown and arbitrary input-
output channel that is independent of the SV source. It
is worth noting that no randomness may be extracted
under these assumptions in a classical setting, while the
violation of the Bell inequality by certain quantum boxes
allows to amplify randomness in a device-independent
setting. As we shall see following the analysis in [8], dc
can be bounded as
dc ≤ |S|d. (9)
with the distance d given as
d =
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ,
(10)
for a derived distribution q(x, u, z, t, e). The assump-
tions in the protocol imply that q(x, u, z, t, e) obeys (for
details see the Supplemental Material and [8])
q(x, z|u, t, e) = q(x, z|u)
q(x|z, u, t, e) = qt,e,z(x|u) is time-ordered no-signaling
q(u|z, e) and q(t|z, u, e)obey the SV source conditions.
(11)
OUTLINE OF THE PROOF
The proof of security of the protocol follows along
similar lines to the proof we presented in [8] but with
some crucial differences which we now elaborate. As in
previous works on randomness amplification [5, 7, 8],
the idea of the protocol is to use the ε-SV source to
choose the measurement settings in a Bell test. After
verifying that the expected violation of the Bell inequal-
ity is obtained and conditioned upon another test being
passed (the requirement of a new test in our protocol is
explained below), the measurement outcomes are com-
bined along with further bits from the SV source using
a randomness extractor [2, 6] to yield the final random
bits S. The devices may have been prepared by a supra-
quantum adversary Eve who may have used arbitrary
no-signaling resources for the task. Eve could also have
had access to the SV source and therefore could have
a classical random variable (which we denote e) corre-
lated to the bits from the SV source as long as the con-
straint in Eq.(1) is obeyed.
Let us first recall that for the task of randomness am-
plification of SV sources, one needs Bell inequalities
where quantum mechanics can achieve the maximal no-
signaling value of the inequality [5], failing this condi-
tion for sufficiently small ε, the observed correlations
4may be faked with classical deterministic boxes. How-
ever, Bell inequalities with this property are not suffi-
cient, this is exemplified by the tripartite Mermin in-
equality [37] as noted in [5]. This inequality is alge-
braically violated in quantum theory using a GHZ state,
however for any function of the measurement outcomes
one can find no-signaling boxes which achieve the max-
imum violation of the inequality and for which this par-
ticular function is deterministic thereby providing an at-
tack for Eve to predict with certainty the final output
bit. While [7] and [8] considered Bell inequalities with
more parties, the problem of finding two-party alge-
braically violated Bell inequalities (alternatively known
as pseudo-telepathy games) with the property of ran-
domness for some function of the measurement out-
comes was open. Unfortunately, none of the bipartite
Bell inequalities tested so far have the property that
all no-signaling boxes which maximally violate the in-
equality have randomness for some function of the mea-
surement outcomes f(x) for some input u in the sense
that for all such boxes
1
2
− γ ≤ P (f(x)|u) ≤ 1
2
+ γ (12)
for some 0 < γ < 12 . We call Bell inequalities with prop-
erty (12) as guaranteeing strong randomness.
The Bell inequality we consider for the task of ran-
domness amplification is a modified version of the bi-
partite inequality based on Kochen-Specker games in
[35]. The inequality involves two parties Alice and Bob,
each making one of nine possible measurements and ob-
taining one of four possible outcomes and is explained
further in the Supplemental Material. Even though it
does not guarantee the strong randomness in Eq.(12)
for any function of the measurement outcomes f(x) for
any input u, it has the redeeming feature of giving weak
randomness in the following sense. For all no-signaling
boxes which algebraically violate the inequality, there
exists one measurement setting u∗ and one outcome x∗
for this setting such that
0 ≤ P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 1
2
+ γ
∀{P (x|u)} s.t B · {P (x|u)} = 0 (13)
for some 0 < γ < 12 . The above fact is checked by use of
a standard linear programming technique elaborated in
Lemma 2 in the Supplemental Material.
We propose a novel technique in the form of a sec-
ond test akin to partial tomography subsequent to the
Bell test which allows us to extract randomness in this
minimal scenario of weak randomness. This second test
simply checks for the number of times the output x∗ ap-
pears when the measurement setting u∗ is chosen, the
analysis of this test is done as for the Bell test by an ap-
plication of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. We also
show that the SV source obeys a generalized Chernoff
bound that ensures that with high probability when the
inputs are chosen with such a source, the measurement
setting u∗ appears in a linear fraction of the runs. Thus,
conditioned on both tests in the protocol being passed
(which happens with large probability with the use of
the SV source and good quantum boxes by the honest
parties), we obtain that with high probability over the
input, the output is a source of linear min-entropy.
This allows us to use known results on randomness
extractors for two independent sources of linear min-
entropy [2], namely one given by the outputs of the
measurement and the other given by the SV source. As
shown in [8], one can use extractors secure against clas-
sical side information even in the scenario of general no-
signaling adversaries by accepting a loss in the rate of
the protocol, i.e., by increasing the output error. The
randomness extractor used in the protocol is a non ex-
plicit extractor from [2]. It readily follows from the re-
sults in [8] that one can also get a protocol with an ex-
plicit extractor using a device with three no-signaling
components with an additional de-Finetti theorem for
no-signaling devices with subsystems chosen using a
Santha-Vazirani source (see Protocol II with the use of
Lemma 13 in [8]).
CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this article, we presented a device-independent
protocol to amplify randomness from the most mini-
mal conditions under which such a task is possible, and
used it to obtain secure random bits from an arbitrar-
ily (but not fully) deterministic Santha-Vazirani source.
The protocol uses a device consisting of only two non-
signaling components, and works with correlations at-
tainable by noisy quantum mechanical resources. More-
over the correctness of the protocol is not based on quan-
tum mechanics and only requires the no-signaling prin-
ciple.
Important open questions still remain. In particular, it
is important to construct efficient protocols that in addi-
tion give a constant rate of random bits for each use of
the device, note that the protocol here still has the draw-
back of zero rate. Another interesting open question is
to amplify the randomness of more general min-entropy
sources that do not possess the structure of the Santha-
Vazirani source. Finally, a significant open problem is
to realize device-independent quantum key distribution
with an imperfect source of randomness, tolerating con-
stant error rates and achieving constant key rates.
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Supplemental Material. Here, we present the formal
proof of security of Protocol I.
ASSUMPTIONS
Let us first state formally the assumptions in our pro-
tocol, for details see [8].
6• No-signaling assumptions: The box satisfies the
constraint of no-signaling between the honest par-
ties and Eve as well as a no-signaling condition be-
tween the different components of each device
p(x|u′, w) = p(x|u′),
p(z|u′, w) = p(z|w),
p(xi|u′) = p(xi|u′i) i = 1, 2. (14)
Each device component also obeys a time-ordered
no-signaling (tons) condition for the k ∈ [n] runs
performed on it:
p(xik|z, u′i, w, u, t, e) =
p(xik|z, u′i≤k, w, u, t, e) ∀k ∈ [n] (15)
where u′i≤k := u
′i
1 , . . . , u
′i
k .
• SV conditions: The variables (u, t, e) form an SV
source, that is satisfy Eq. (1). In particular, p(t|u, e)
is also obeys the SV source condition.
• Assumption A1: The devices do not signal to the
SV source, i.e. the distribution of (u, t, e) is inde-
pendent of the inputs (u′, w):∑
x,z
p(x, z, u, t, e|u′, w) = p(u, t, e)
∀(u, t, e, u′, w). (16)
• Assumption A2: The box is fixed independently
of the SV source:
p(x, z|u′, w, u, t, e) = p(x, z|u′, w)
∀(x, z, u′, w, u, t, e). (17)
The composable security criterion is defined in terms
of the distance dc from Eq. (8)
dc =
∑
s,e
max
w
∑
z
∣∣∣∣p(s, z, e|w,ACC)− 1|S|p(z, e|w,ACC)
∣∣∣∣ .
(18)
Let us define the quantity d′ as
d′ :=
∑
e
p(e|ACC) max
w
∑
z,u
p(z, u|e, w,ACC)×
∑
s
∣∣∣∣p(s|z, w, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ (19)
for any family of probability distributions
{p(x, z, u, t, e|w)}. Now, for each e, let we and
pwe(x, z, u, t, e) denote the input of Eve and the
corresponding probability distribution respectively that
achieve the maximum d′ in Eq. (19). By Assumption
A1 and the no-signaling conditions, p(e|w) = p(e) and
p(x, u|w) = p(x, u) so that the maximum is achieved by
a distribution q(x, z, u, t, e) = p(e)pwe(x, z, u, t|e). We
can thus consider the quantity d = d′ given as
d =
∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC)
∑
s
∣∣∣∣q(s|z, u, e,ACC)− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ .
(20)
As shown in [8], we have
dc ≤ |S|d. (21)
From the assumptions stated, it is seen that q(x, u, z, t, e)
obeys
q(x, z|u, t, e) = q(x, z|u)
q(x|z, u, t, e) = qt,e,z(x|u)is time-ordered no-signaling
q(u|z, e) and q(t|z, u, e)obey the SV source conditions.
(22)
THE BELL INEQUALITY
The Bell inequality we consider for the task of ran-
domness amplification is a modified version of the bi-
partite inequality in [35]. The inequality belongs to the
class (2, 9, 4) signifying that it involves two parties Al-
ice and Bob, each making one of nine possible measure-
ments and obtaining one of four possible outcomes. We
label the measurement settings of Alice u1 and those of
Bob u2 with u1,u2 ∈ {1, . . . , 9}. The corresponding out-
comes of Alice are labeled x1 and those of Bob x2 with
x1, x2 ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Note that from the notation in the
main text these inputs and outputs would correspond
to a particular run of the protocol uij , x
i
j . Acting on a
box {P (x|u)} with x = (x1, x2) and u = (u1,u2), the Bell
expression may be written as
B · {P (x|u)} =
∑
x,u
B(x,u)P (x|u) ≥ 4, (23)
Here B is an indicator vector with entries
B(x,u) =
{
1 : (x,u) ∈ SB
0 : otherwise (24)
The minimum value achieved by local realistic theo-
ries for this combination of probabilities is 4 while gen-
eral no-signaling theories can achieve the algebraic min-
imum value of 0. Crucially, there exist a quantum state
and suitable measurements reaching this algebraic min-
imum.
The set SB =
⋃
SuB for which B(x,u) = 1 is defined
using the orthogonality hypergraph in Fig. 2 which rep-
resents a Kochen-Specker set of vectors from [36] dis-
playing state-independent contextuality in dimension 4.
In this graph, the nine measurements are represented by
the nine colored hyperedges each giving four outcomes,
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the Kochen-Specker set used in formu-
lating the bipartite Bell inequality
where the vertices represent rank-one projectors corre-
sponding to the outcomes. Each party performs the nine
measurements corresponding to the KS set, the set SB
consists of all 81 pairs of measurements u. For each u,
the pair of outcomes x ∈ SuB if the vertex representing
outcome x1 in u1 is connected by a hyperedge to the
vertex representing outcome x2 in u2. A direct count-
ing shows that out of the 42 × 92 = 1296 probabilities
P (x|u), 504 enter the Bell expression. Moreover, in any
deterministic assignment of 1′s and 0′s to these prob-
abilities respecting the no-signaling and normalization
constraints, at least four probabilities are assigned value
1 giving rise to the local realistic bound. In quantum
theory and in general no-signaling theories however, all
504 probabilities may be set to 0 giving rise to the alge-
braic violation of the inequality.
In order to achieve the maximal violation within
quantum theory, Alice and Bob share a maximally en-
tangled state in dimension four, namely
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
4∑
i=1
|i〉 ⊗ |i〉. (25)
The measurements they each perform correspond ex-
actly to the 18 projectors defining the Kochen-Specker
set in [36]. Specifically, these projectors correspond to
the following vectors
|v1〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T |v2〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0)T |v3〉 = (0, 0, 1, 1)T |v4〉 = (0, 0, 1,−1)T
|v5〉 = (1,−1, 0, 0)T |v6〉 = (1, 1,−1,−1)T |v7〉 = (1, 1, 1, 1)T |v8〉 = (1,−1, 1,−1)T
|v9〉 = (1, 0,−1, 0)T |v10〉 = (0, 1, 0,−1)T |v11〉 = (1, 0, 1, 0)T |v12〉 = (1, 1,−1, 1)T
|v13〉 = (−1, 1, 1, 1)T |v14〉 = (1, 1, 1,−1)T |v15〉 = (1, 0, 0, 1)T |v16〉 = (0, 1,−1, 0)T
|v17〉 = (0, 1, 1, 0)T |v18〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1)T
(26)
The nine measurements are defined by the following nine bases
M1 = (|v1〉, |v2〉, |v3〉, |v4〉) M2 = (|v4〉, |v5〉, |v6〉, |v7〉) M3 = (|v7〉, |v8〉, |v9〉, |v10〉)
M4 = (|v10〉, |v11〉, |v12〉, |v13〉) M5 = (|v13〉, |v14〉, |v15〉, |v16〉) M6 = (|v16〉, |v17〉, |v18〉, |v1〉)
M7 = (|v2〉, |v9〉, |v11〉, |v18〉) M8 = (|v3〉, |v5〉, |v12〉, |v14〉) M9 = (|v6〉, |v8〉, |v15〉, |v17〉)
(27)
For this state and measurements all the probabilities en-
tering the Bell expression are identically zero, so that al-
gebraic violation is achieved.
Apart from the fact that quantum mechanics violates
the inequality, we would also like to ensure that a strong
violation of the inequality guarantees randomness. Un-
fortunately, none of the bipartite Bell inequalities tested
so far have this property. The above inequality though
has the following redeeming feature. Let u∗ ≡ (1, 2) be a
particular pair of measurement settings and x∗ ≡ (1, 3)
a chosen pair of outcomes for this setting. For all no-
signaling boxes which algebraically violate the inequal-
ity, it holds that
0 ≤ P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 3
4
∀{P (x|u)} s.t B · {P (x|u)} = 0 (28)
It should be noted that for the quantum box which al-
8gebraically violates the inequality defined by the above
state and measurements, we have Pq(x = x∗|u = u∗) =
1
16 so that upon maximal violation, we expect a fixed
number of outputs x∗ for inputs u∗ in the experiment.
Moreover, for boxes with a Bell value δ, we will see in
Lemma 2 that 0 ≤ P (x∗|u∗) ≤ 14 (3 + 2δ). So that, when
one has large violation of the inequality and a sufficient
number of outputs and inputs (x∗,u∗), it must be the
case that a sufficient number of runs in the experiment
were done with boxes that yield randomness.
(Partial)Randomness from an observed Bell value
Using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, we have that
if the observed Bell value is small, then a linear fraction
of the conditional boxes have a small Bell value for set-
tings chosen with an SV source. To obtain a min-entropy
source, we need to have that a linear fraction of the con-
ditional boxes has randomness. In this section, we es-
tablish the consequence to randomness of the observed
Bell value.
Let U denote all the settings appearing in the Bell ex-
pression. We consider first the uniform Bell value
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} =
1
|U|
∑
u,x
B(x,u)P (x|u), (29)
where |U| denotes the cardinality of U, i.e. the total
number of settings in the Bell expression (|U| = 81 for
the Bell inequality we consider). If the Bell function
B(x,u) is properly chosen, one can prove using linear
programming that ifB
U
is small, the probabilities of any
output are bounded away from 1. However, since our
inputs to each device are chosen using a SV source, we
will be only able to estimate the value of the following
expression
B
SV
=
∑
u,x
νSV (u)B(x,u)P (x|u), (30)
where νSV (u) is the distribution from an (unknown) SV
source. Let us note that the number of bits needed by
each party to choose their settings is dlog 9e = 4, so that
u is chosen using 2 dlog 9e = 8 bits. We will show that for
the Bell function, when B
SV
is small, B
U
is also small
which implies randomness (for suitably chosen δ > 0).
Lemma 2. Consider a two-party no-signaling box {P (x|u)}
satisfying
B
SV ≤ δ, (31)
for some constant δ ≥ 0, where BSV is given by Eq. (30)
with B(x,u) given by Eq. (24). Then for the particular mea-
surement setting u∗ and particular output x∗, we have
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(
3 +
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
. (32)
Proof. From the definition of an ε-SV source we have(
1
2
− ε
)8
≤ νSV (u) ≤
(
1
2
+ ε
)8
. (33)
so that
1
( 12 + ε)
8|U|B
SV ≤ BU ≤ 1
( 12 − ε)8|U|
B
SV
(34)
We can therefore work with the Bell value for uni-
formly chosen settings, relating it to the Bell value with
SV source settings through Eq. (34). For B
SV ≤ δ,
Eq.(34) gives that B
U ≤ δ
( 12−ε)8|U|
=: δ˜|U| .
Consider a bipartite no-signaling box P (x|u) satisfy-
ing
B
U
:=
1
|U|B.{P (x|u)} ≤
δ˜
|U| , (35)
with B the indicator vector for the Bell expression in Eq.
(23) and |U| = 81 the number of settings in the Bell ex-
pression.
The maximum probability for the chosen output and
input for the given (uniform) Bell value can be com-
puted by the following linear program
max
{P}
: MTu∗,x∗ · {P (x|u)}
s.t. A · {P (x|u)} ≤ c. (36)
Here, the indicator vector Mu∗,x∗ is a 42 × 92 ele-
ment vector with entries Mu∗,x∗(x,u) = Iu=u∗Ix=x∗ , i.e.,
Mu∗,x∗(x,u) = 1 for (x,u) = (x∗,u∗) and 0 otherwise.
The constraint on the box {P (x|u)} written as a vector
with 42×92 entries is given by the matrix A and the vec-
tor c. These encode the no-signaling constraints between
the two parties, the normalization and the positivity
constraints on the probabilities P (x|u). In addition, A
and c also encode the condition that B.{P (x|u)} ≤ δ˜ for
a constant δ˜ ≥ 0.
The solution to the primal linear program in Eq. (36)
can be bounded by a feasible solution to the dual pro-
gram which is written as
min
λu∗,x∗
: cT · λu∗,x∗
s.t. AT · λu∗,x∗ = Mu∗,x∗ ,
λu∗,x∗ ≥ 0. (37)
We find a feasible λu∗,x∗ satisfying the constraints to the
dual program above that gives cTλu∗,x∗ ≤ 14 (3 + 2δ˜). 1
1 The explicit vector λu∗,x∗ that is feasible for the dual program in Eq.
(37) and gives the bound can be computed by standard techniques
and is available upon request.
9We therefore obtain by standard duality of linear pro-
gramming that
P (x = x∗|u = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(3 + 2δ˜). (38)
Noting that δ˜ = δ
( 12−ε)8
, we obtain the required bound.
uunionsq
FROM EMPIRICAL VALUES TO TRUE PARAMETERS OF
THE BOX
In this section, we state the lemmas based on the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality and the Generalized Cher-
noff bound which we will use to estimate the arithmetic
average of Bell values for the conditional boxes as well
as the fraction of boxes which have a lower bound. Let
us state the following Lemma 3 based on the Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality which we will use to estimate the
arithmetic average of Bell values for the conditional
boxes as well as the straightforward Lemma 4 whose
proofs can be found in [8].
Lemma 3. Consider arbitrary random variables Wi for i =
0, 1, . . . , n, and binary random variables Bi for i = 1, . . . n
that are functions of Wi, i.e. Bi = fi(Wi) for some functions
fi. Let us denote Bi = E(Bi|Wi−1, . . . ,W1,W0) for i =
1, . . . , n and (i.e. Bi are conditional means). Define for k =
1, . . . , n, the empirical average
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi (39)
and the arithmetic average of conditional means
Lk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi. (40)
Then we have
Pr(|Ln − Ln| ≥ s) ≤ 2e−n s
2
2 (41)
Lemma 4. If the arithmetic average Ln of n conditional
means satisfies Ln ≤ δ for some parameter δ > 0, then in
at least (1−√δ)n of positions i we have Bi ≤
√
δ
Proving the lower bound for a fraction of boxes
In this section, we estimate the fraction of boxes for
which q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) is lower bounded
by a constant. To do so, we perform a test using the
random variables Dui (x) for any fixed u
Dui (x) := D(xi,ui) =
{
1 : xi = x∗ ∧ ui = u∗
0 : otherwise
for i = 1, . . . , n. The test function is defined as
Sn(x, u) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
D(xi,ui) (42)
with the corresponding average Sn(x, u, z, e) defined as
Sn(x, u, z, e) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E∼q(xi|x<i,u,z,e)D(xi,ui). (43)
The test checks if
Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1 (44)
for a fixed µ1 > 0.
We now show that when the test accepts, with proba-
bility 1− 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
at least µ1−2κ2(1−κ)n boxes have ran-
domness in the output for input setting u∗, specifically
that q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ for fixed κ > 0.
Lemma 5. Assume that the test given by Eq. (44)
for the box q(x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) accepts
(for fixed µ1 > 0). Consider the set Iκ(u) :=
{i : ui = u∗ ∧ q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ}.
With probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
, |Iκ(u)| ≥
µ1−2κ
2(1−κ)n.
Proof. When the test is passed, i.e., when Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1,
by Lemma 3 with probability at least 1− 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
,
we have that Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ µ12 . In other words, we have∑
i
q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ µ1
2
, (45)
where we used the no-signaling condition q(xi =
x∗|u, z, e) = q(xi = x∗|ui = u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e). Consider
the set Iκ(u), we have that
(n− |Iκ(u)|)κ+ |Iκ(u)| ≥ µ1
2
n (46)
or
|Iκ(u)| ≥ µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)n. (47)
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
−nµ218
)
the set of boxes with ui = u∗ and q(xi = x∗|ui =
u∗,u<i, x<i, z, e) ≥ κ for fixed µ1 > 0, 0 < κ < 12 is
of size at least µ1−2κ2(1−κ)n. uunionsq
A min-entropy source from randomness of conditional
boxes
In this section we show that if a device is such
that a linear number of conditional boxes have ran-
domness (in the weak sense that the probability of
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the outputs is bounded away from one for any one
setting and this particular setting appears a linear
fraction of times), then the distribution on outputs
constitutes a min-entropy source. Let any sequence
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un) be such that xi and ui, i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, are of the form of x = (x1, x2) and u =
(u1,u2), respectively. Consider that with large proba-
bility over sequences (z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un), a particu-
lar setting u∗ appears a linear fraction µn times and that
within this fraction, the probability of x∗ and its comple-
mentary outcome x¯∗ is bounded away from 1, then the
total probability distribution is close in variational dis-
tance to a min-entropy source. To show this, we use the
following lemma from [8]
Lemma 6. Fix any measure P on the space of sequences
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un). Suppose that for a sequence
(z, e, x1,u1, . . . , xn,un), there exists K ⊆ [n] of size larger
than µn, such that for all l ∈ K we have ul = u∗ and the
conditional boxes Px<l,u<l(xl|ul, z, e) satisfy
Px<l,u<l(xl|ul = u∗, z, e) ≤ γ. (48)
Then, P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) satisfies
P (x1, . . . , xn|u1, . . . ,un, z, e) ≤ γµn. (49)
SECURITY PROOF
Let us first recall the definition of a min-entropy
source and the notion of an independent source ran-
domness extractor, specifying the extractor we will use
to obtain randomness in our protocol. The min-entropy
of a random variable S is given by
Hmin(S) = min
s∈supp(S)
log
1
P (S = s)
, (50)
where supp(S) denotes the support of S. For S ∈
{0, 1}n, the source is called an (n,Hmin(S)) min-
entropy source. An independent source extractor Ext :
({0, 1}n)k → {0, 1}m is a function that acts on k indepen-
dent min-entropy sources and outputs m bits that are ξ
close to uniform, i.e., for k independent (n,Hmin(Si))
sources (with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) we have
‖Ext(S1, . . . , Sk)− Um‖1 ≤ ξ, (51)
where ‖.‖1 is the variational distance between the two
distributions and Um denotes the uniform distribution
on the m bits. For use in Protocol I, we use a (non-
explicit) deterministic extractor from [2] that, given two
independent sources of min-entropy larger than h, out-
puts Ω(h) bits 2−Ω(h)-close to uniform.
Let us define the set AzδAz1 as
AzδAz1 := {(z, u, e) :
Pr
∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
) ≤ Az1}
(52)
and the cut
AzδAz1 (u) := {(z, e) : (z, u, e) ∈ AzδAz1 }.
(53)
Let us also define the set Azµ12 (u) for any fixed u as
Azµ12 (u) := {(z, e) :
Pr
∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
Sn(x, u, z, e) ≤ Sn(x, u)− µ1
2
)
≤ Az2}
(54)
with Az1 = 2e−n
1
4 δ
2
Az and Az2 = 2e−n
µ21
16 and the set
Az(u) as
Az(u) := AzδAz1 (u) ∩Azµ12 (u). (55)
Note that despite the apparent similarity in the nomen-
clature of AzδAz1 (u) and Az
µ1
2 (u), they differ in the re-
spect that Azµ12 (u) is a set of large measure for every u
(as seen in Eq. (58)) while AzδAz1 (u) is a set of large mea-
sure only for most (typical) u. Here
Ln(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
B(xi,ui),
L¯n(x, u, z, e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eq(xi,ui|x<i,u<i,z,e)B(xi,ui).(56)
Similarly,
Sn(x, u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
D(xi,ui),
Sn(x, u, z, e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eq(xi,|x<i,u,z,e)D(xi,ui). (57)
Applying Lemma 3, taking W0 = (z, e), Wi = (xi,ui)
for i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain by a direct application of the
Markov inequality that∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e) ≥ 1− Az1
∑
(z,e)∈Azµ12 (u)
q(z, e|u) ≥ 1− Az2. (58)
To elaborate, we get from Lemma 3 that
Pr
(x,u,z,e)∼q(x,u,z,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
) ≤ 2Az1
Pr
(z,u,e)∼q(z,u,e)
[ Pr
x∼q(x|z,u,e)
(
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≥ Ln(x, u) + δAz
)
≥ Az1] ≤ Az1 (59)
and the second inequality in Eq.(58) is obtained simi-
larly.
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Also, as stated previously we define the sets ACC1
and ACC2 as the sets of (x, u) for which the tests in the
protocol are passed, i.e.,
ACC1 := {(x, u) : Ln(x, u) ≤ δ}
ACC2 := {(x, u) : Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1} , (60)
and the set ACC = ACC1 ∩ ACC2 of (x, u) for which
both tests in the protocol are passed. Let us also define
ACCu := {x : (x, u) ∈ ACC}. (61)
We are now ready to formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Consider the measure q(x, z, u, t, e) satisfying
Eq.(22). For constant δ1 > 0, we have that
Pr
∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC)
. (62)
Proof. Let us write∑
z,u,e
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
=
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
+
∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC).
(63)
and bound the two terms separately. The first term can
be simply bounded as
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
maxx q(x|z,u,e,ACC)≤1≤
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC)
q(z,u,e,ACC)≤q(z,u,e)
≤
∑
(z,u,e)/∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
Eq.(58)
≤
∑
u
Az1
q(ACC)
. (64)
For the second term, with (z, u, e) ∈ AzδAz1 , we have
that for fixed u, (z, e) ∈ AzδAz1 (u). We therefore split the
second term as
∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
=
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩Az
µ1
2 (u)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) +
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC),
(65)
where (Azµ12 (u))
c denotes the complement of the set
Azµ12 (u). Let us first consider the case when (z, e) ∈
AzδAz1 (u) ∩ Azµ12 (u), i.e., (z, e) ∈ Az(u). We define the
sets
X
(z,u,e)
g1 = {x : L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≤ Ln(x, u) + δAz},
X
(z,u,e)
g2 = {x : Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ Sn(x, u)−
µ1
2
},
(66)
and the complements
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1
)c
,
(
X
(z,u,e)
g2
)c
.
By the definition of AzδAz1 (u), for (z, e) ∈ AzδAz1 (u)
and x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1
)c
, we have
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az1 (67)
for Az1 = 2e−n
1
4 δ
2
Az . Similarly, by the definition of
Azµ12 (u), for (z, e) ∈ Azµ12 (u) and x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g2
)c
, we
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have
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az2 (68)
for Az2 = 2e−n
µ21
16 . Therefore, for (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and
x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)c
∩ACCu, we have that
q(x|z, u, e) ≤ Az1 + Az2. (69)
Now let us look at the case when (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and
x ∈
(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)
∩ ACCu. By the definition of
ACC1, we have Ln(x, u) ≤ δ, and by the definition of
X
(z,u,e)
g1 we have that
L¯n(x, u, z, e) ≤ δ + δAz. (70)
By Lemma 4, for at least µ2n positions i where µ2 = 1−√
δ + δAz , there is
Eq(xi,ui|x<i,u<i,z,e)B(xi,ui) ≤
√
δ + δAz =
√
2δ, (71)
where we have simply set δAz = δ for constant δ > 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 2, at these µ2n positions i, we have
that for the particular input and output pair ui = u∗ and
xi = x∗
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi = x
∗|ui = u∗) ≤ 1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
. (72)
Note that we will choose δ such that
1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)
< 1
i.e., 0 < δ <
( 12 − ε)16
8
(73)
to have the above probability bounded below unity.
Similarly, by the definition of ACC2, Sn(x, u) ≥ µ1, and
by the definition of X(z,u,e)g2 , we have that
Sn(x, u, z, e) ≥ µ1
2
. (74)
By Lemma 5, for at least µ3n positions i, where µ3 =
µ1−2κ
2(1−κ) for fixed κ > 0, we have
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi = x
∗|ui = u∗) ≥ κ. (75)
Therefore, for (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and x ∈(
X
(z,u,e)
g1 ∩X(z,u,e)g2
)
∩ ACCu, we have that there
are at least µ4n positions i with µ4 = (µ3 + µ2 − 1) for
which
qx<i,u<i,z,e(xi|ui = u∗) ≤ γ (76)
for xi = x∗ as well as xi 6= x∗. Here,
γ = max
{
(1− κ) , 1
4
(
3 +
2
√
2δ
( 12 − )8
)}
. (77)
In order to have µ4 > 0, i.e., µ3 + µ2 > 1 we will choose
constant δ > 0 such that
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ) −
√
2δ > 0,
i.e., δ <
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2
. (78)
Combining Eq. (73) and Eq.(78) we have that
δ < min
{
( 12 − ε)16
8
,
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2}
(79)
Therefore, for any (z, e) ∈ Az(u) and x ∈ ACCu, com-
bining Eq. (69) and Eq.(76) we have from Lemma 6 that
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) = maxx∈ACCu q(x|z, u, e)
q(ACC|z, u, e)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC|z, u, e) .
(80)
From the above considerations, we can bound∑
u
(z,e)∈Az(u)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
Eq. (80)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈Az(u)
q(z, u, e|ACC)max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC|z, u, e)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γµ4n}
∑
(z,u,e)
q(z, u, e)
q(ACC)
≤ max{Az1 + Az2, γ
µ4n}
q(ACC)
. (81)
We can also simply bound
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∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈AzδAz1 (u)∩(Az
µ1
2 (u))
c
q(z, u, e|ACC)
q(z,u,e,ACC)≤q(z,u,e)
≤
∑
u
(z,e)∈(Azµ12 (u))
c
q(u)q(z, e|u)
q(ACC)
Eq.(58)
≤ Az2
q(ACC)
. (82)
Inserting the bounds from Eqs. (81) and (82) into Eq.(65)
gives ∑
(z,u,e)∈AzδAz1
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤ Az1 + 2Az2 + γ
µ4n
q(ACC)
(83)
Finally, inserting the bounds from Eqs.(64) and (83) into
Eq. (63) gives∑
(z,u,e)
q(z, u, e|ACC) max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC)
≤ 2(Az1 + Az2) + γ
µ4n
q(ACC)
(84)
Applying Markov inequality, setting δ1 = 2(Az1 +
Az2) + γ
µ4n, we get that
Pr
∼q(z,u,e|ACC)
(
max
x
q(x|z, u, e,ACC) ≤
√
δ1
q(ACC)
)
≥ 1−
√
δ1
q(ACC)
. (85)
This completes the proof. uunionsq
We now note the following lemma which follows
from the assumptions stated in the text (for a proof see
[8])
Lemma 8. For any probability distribution q(x, z, u, t, e)
satisfying Eq.(22) it holds that
q(x|z, u, t, e, ACC) = q(x|z, u,ACC). (86)
We use Lemma 8 along with Lemma 7 to obtain the
following theorem whose proof follows a similar state-
ment in [8] showing that either the tests in the proto-
col are passed with vanishing probability or we obtain
|S| = 2Ω(n1/4) secure random bits.
Theorem 9. Suppose we are given  > 0. For fixed µ1 > 0,
0 < κ < µ12 , set δ > 0 such that
δ < min
{
( 12 − ε)16
8
,
1
2
[
µ1 − 2κ
2(1− κ)
]2}
(87)
Then for any probability distribution pw(x, z, u, t, e) sat-
isfying Eq.(22) there exists an extractor Ext producing
Ext(x, t) = s with |S| = 2Ω(n1/4) values, such that
dc · p(ACC) ≤ 2−Ω(n1/4), (88)
where dc is given by Eq. (8).
PASSING THE TESTS WITH QUANTUM BOXES
Finally, we check that for suitable parameters δ and
µ1 both tests in the protocol are passed with the use of
good quantum boxes by the honest parties.
Generalized Chernoff bound for Santha-Vazirani sources
The final part of the proof is to show that if the honest
parties use good quantum boxes, the tests in the proto-
col are passed with high probability. We first show that
the Santha-Vazirani source satisfies an exponential con-
centration property given by the following generalized
Chernoff bound, which will imply that the second test
in the protocol is feasible, i.e., that in a linear fraction of
the runs the setting u∗ appears.
Theorem 10. (Generalized Chernoff bound)[33, 34] Let
Xi for i ∈ [n] be Boolean random variables such that for
some 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, we have that, for every subset S ⊆ [n]
Pr [∧i∈SXi = 1] ≤ ζ |S|. Then, for any 0 ≤ ζ ≤ γ ≤ 1
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn
]
≤ e−nD(γ||ζ), (89)
where D(·||·) is the relative entropy function. In particular
D(γ||ζ) ≥ 2(γ − ζ)2.
We show now that the SV source satisfies the assump-
tion of the above theorem, i.e., that probability of not
obtaining the input u∗ in a subset of size k is upper
bounded by ζk for ζ =
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] with 2m being
the number of bits the two parties need to choose a sin-
gle u (2m = 2 dlog 9e = 8 for the Bell inequality we con-
sider).
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Lemma 11. For any non-empty subset of k indices
(i1, ..., ik) ⊆ [n], and n consecutive instances of random vari-
able U chosen according to measure ν using 2mn bits from
an -SV source (where 2m is the number of bits required to
choose a single instance u), for any fixed u∗ in the range of U ,
we have
Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗) ≤
[
1−
(
1
2
− 
)2m]k
(90)
Proof. Let us assume, w.l.o.g. that ik ≥ ik−1 ≥ ... ≥ i1.
We have
Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u
∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗)
=
∑
{uij }:ij /∈{i1,...,ik}
Pr∼ν(u1, . . . ,ui1 6= u
∗, . . . ,uik 6= u∗, . . . ,un)
=
∑
{uij }:ij /∈{i1,...,ik}
Pr∼ν(u1) Pr∼ν(ui1 6= u
∗|u1, . . . ,ui1−1) . . .Pr∼ν(uik 6= u
∗|u1, . . . ,uik−1) . . .Pr∼ν(un|u1, . . . ,un−1)
≤
[
1−
(
1
2
− 
)2m]k
(91)
The last inequality is obtained by noting that for terms
with ij ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, by the definition of the SV source
P (uij 6= u∗|u1, . . . ,uij−1) ≤
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] with 2m
being the number of bits required to obtain any input u,
and for the terms with ij /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, the sum over uij
gives unity by normalization. uunionsq
Consider the random variable Xi defined as
Xi :=
{
1 : ui 6= u∗
0 : otherwise
for ui chosen using the SV source ν(·). Theorem 10 to-
gether with Lemma 11 gives that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn
]
≤ e−2n(γ−ζ)2 , (92)
or equivalently
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi < γn
]
≥ 1− e−2n(γ−ζ)2 , (93)
for ζ =
[
1− ( 12 − )2m] and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ γ ≤ 1. For U˜(u) :=
{i : ui = u∗} and Ch := {u : |U˜(u)| ≥ µ5n} for some
constant µ5 > 0, Eq. (93) gives that
∑
u∈Ch
ν(u) ≥ 1− e−2n(1−µ5−ζ)2 . (94)
Therefore, we obtain that with probability 1 −
e−2n(1−µ5−ζ)
2
, ui = u∗ for a fraction µ5 of the n runs.
We note that with the use of the state and measurements
from Eqs.(25), (26) and (27), we obtain a box {Pq(x|u)}
that achieves maximal violation of the Bell inequality,
i.e., B.{Pq(x|u)} = 0 and also has Pq(x = x∗|u = u∗) =
1
16 . Therefore, for suitably chosen δ, µ1 > 0 the two tests
in the protocol are passed with high probability with the
use of good quantum boxes.
